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Will Tenure Voting Give Corporate Managers
Lifetime Tenure?
By Paul H. Edelman,* Wei Jiang**
& Randall S. Thomas***
Dual-class voting systems have been widely employed in recent initial
public offerings by large tech companies but have been roundly condemned by
institutional investors and the S&P 500. As an alternative, commentators have
proposed adoption of tenure voting systems, where investor voting rights
increase with the length of time that they hold shares. In furtherance of this
proposal, some Silicon Valley investors have requested that the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) permit the creation of a new stock exchange where
all of the companies will be required to use tenure voting systems.
Is tenure voting a better choice than dual-class stock for both corporate
management and shareholders? In this Essay, we review the arguments for and
against enure voting that have been made in the literature. In order to shed light
on these claims' veracity, we generate the first database that documents
institutional investor portfolio turnover rates for stocks. We use this data to
inform our mathematical voting model of tenure voting to show how its adoption
would affect control rights within the corporation.
We make two main findings that shed light on this question. First, we show
that when corporate management holds a large block of company stock prior to
the implementation of tenure voting and retains at least 20%-30% of the total
number of company shares on a long-term basis, then tenure voting will ensure
that corporate managers maintain control of the company even in the face of an
attempted change-of-control transaction by a highly motivated dissident
shareholder. Our second important finding is that if corporate management
chooses to sell off its large initial block of the company's tock over time, so that
inside ownership levels eventually drop down to a low percentage l vel with the
majority of ownership held by institutional shareholders with different
investment horizons, then the use of tenure voting systems does little to protect
management control in a proxy contest for corporate control.
We conclude that tenure voting does indeed represent an intermediate form
of voting control from a manager's perspective: it does not guarantee
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management control, as dual-class hare structures do, but it does give control
to management who maintain large equity stakes in the firm. Institutional
investors are likely to see it as an improvement over dual-class stock structures
in terms of giving them corporate governance rights, although it is less
advantageous to these shareholders' rights than a one share/one vote voting
system.
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Introduction
In the past decade, many household-name companies have sold their
shares to public investors while using dual-class voting structures to maintain
management control over the company.1 For example, technology
companies, including Alibaba, Facebook, and Google (now Alphabet, Inc.),
have all adopted dual-class voting structures.2 These management-friendly
voting systems have been justified as giving their executives the freedom to
operate their companies with a goal of long-term value maximization.
1. Dual-class offerings usually create two classes of stock--offering low-voting stock to public
shareholders, while increasing the number of votes for insiders' stock. See, e.g., Kishore
Eechambadi, The Dual Class Voting Structure, Associated Agency Issues, and a Path Forward, 13
N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 503, 513 & n.40 (2017) (discussing the strategic use of dual-class voting
structures by several companies, including Google, before their initial public offerings).
2. Matt Orsagh, Dual-Class Shares: From Google to Alibaba, Is It a Troubling Trend for





However, powerful institutional investors dislike these structures because
they insulate managers from shareholder monitoring and create impenetrable
obstacles to change-of-control transactions.3 In reaction to pressure from
these large shareholders, the S&P 500 recently decided to bar newcomer
companies with multiple classes of shares from its flagship index.
4
In an attempt o find an alternative voting system that might appeal to
both groups, prominent legal practitioners and academics recently have
advocated that Silicon Valley companies should consider adopting tenure
voting systems, i.e., a structure that awards greater voting power to shares
held for a longer duration,5 in lieu of using dual-class voting structures.6
Attracted by these efforts, well-known Silicon Valley investors have
petitioned the SEC to let them create a new Long-Term Stock Exchange
(LTSE), all of whose members will use tenure voting.7 In the next few
months, the LTSE intends to seek regulatory approval to become the newest
stock exchange in the United States
Tenure voting may represent an alternative voting system that could
satisfy corporate managers' desire for greater control and simultaneously
give long-term investors-insiders or institutional investors with long-term
investment horizons-a greater role in these firms' governance than at firms
with dual-class equity structures. Tenure voting, also known as time-phased
voting, has been around for many years. While there are relatively few public
3. See Chris Dieterich et al., Stock Indexes Push Back Against Dual-Class Listings, WALL ST.
J. (Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/stock-indexes-push-back-against-dual-class-
listings-1501612170 [https://perma.cc/Q24Q-TZAN] (describing investors' resistance to multiple
classes of shares because they enable early investors and founders to retain voting control of public
companies). In particular, BlackRock Inc., Vanguard Gtoup, and State Street Global Advisors, three
of the world's largest managers of index tracking funds, have called for avoiding unequal voting
rights. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock,
103 VA. L. REV. 585, 597 (2017) (discussing Vanguard's opposition to dual-class structures).
4. Dieterich et al., supra note 3. The policy change resulted in the rejection of potential
eligibility for Snap Inc. and Blue Apron Holdings, Inc., both of which recently went public. Id.
5. With tenure voting, shares that are traded become low-vote shares so that over time long-
term investors that hold their stock gain an increased percentage of the total voting power at the
company.
6. See David J. Berger et al., Tenure Voting and the US. Public Company, 72 Bus. LAW. 295,
297 (2017) (noting that the tenure voting structure has been cited as a solution to short-termism
claims and proposing it as an alternative solution to the dual-class stock structure).
7. Ellen Huet & Brad Stone, Silicon Valley's Audacious Plan to Create a New Stock Exchange,
BLOOMBERG (June 12, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-06-12/silicon-
valley-s-audacious-plan-to-create-a-new-stock-exchange [https://perma.cc/2FCW-7QW5].
8. Alexander Osipovich & Dennis K. Berman, Silicon Valley vs. Wall Street: Can the New





companies in the United States that employ it, several European jurisdictions
have enthusiastically embraced tenure voting to a far greater extent.9
Is tenure voting a better choice than dual-class stock for both corporate
management and shareholders? In this Essay, we make two main findings
that shed light on this question. First, we show that when corporate
management holds a large block of company stock prior to the
implementation of tenure voting and retains at least 200/o-30% of the total
number of company shares on a long-term basis, then tenure voting will
ensure that corporate managers maintain control of the company even in the
face of an attempted change-of-control transaction by a highly motivated
dissident shareholder who owns the maximum amount of stock permitted by
most poison pills.10 From institutional investors' perspective, giving
corporate management control while forcing it to maintain a substantial stake
in the company (and thereby keeping a continuing strong financial incentive
to maximize shareholder value) as the price of control is likely to be
preferable to dual-class voting systems in which public shareholders enjoy
low or virtually no votes because dual-class exclusively allows corporate
management o maintain control even at negligible ownership levels."
Our second important finding is that if corporate management chooses
to sell off its large initial block of the company's stock over time, so that
inside ownership levels eventually drop down to a low percentage level with
the majority of ownership held by institutional shareholders with different
investment horizons, then the use of tenure voting systems does little to
protect management control in a proxy contest for corporate control.
Moreover, it is likely to lead to a transfer of voting power to passive
shareholders who tend to delegate their vote to Institutional Shareholder
Services (ISS), a third-party proxy voting advisory service, and therefore
cause ISS to "sway" even more votes than it does today.' This finding is
9. Lynme L. Dallas & Jordan M. Barry, Long-Term Shareholders and Thme-Phased Voting, 40
DEL J. CoRP. L. 541, 550 (2016).
10. Poison pills, or as they sometimes are called, Rights Plans, are a powerful anti-takeover
device that effectively limit the amount of stock that any unwanted acquirer can purchase without
suffering massive dilution of their stake in the company and the associated economic harm. Randall
S. Thomas, Judicial Review of Defensive Tactics in Proxy Contests: When Is Using a Rights Plan
Right?, 46 VAND. L. REv. 503, 512 (1993). They have been upheld by the Delaware courts and are
widely used by American public companies. Id. at 510, 523. By limiting the number of shares that
a dissident shareholder can accumulate, the poison pill also limits the shareholder's voting power
in a proxy contest for corporate control.
11. For us, it is the exclusivity of this power that is significant. In dual-class corporations, the
high-vote shares are limited in number and generally not available on the market. This confines the
voting power to the founding stockholders. By comparison, any shareholder in a corporation with
tenure voting will have access to high-vote shares as long as they are willing to hold on to their
shares for a sufficient time.
12. Proxy voting advisory services "focus on providing information and voting services to
institutional investors." Paul H. Edelman et al., Shareholder Voting in an Age of Intermediary
[Vol. 97:991
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robust to a wide variety of assumptions about stock ownership levels,
shareholder voting preferences, and the degree of influence of third-party
voting advisors. In other words, tenure voting will preserve management
control only if managers continue to hold a substantial block of shares over
time. Otherwise, tenure voting will give long-term (often time passive)
institutional investors a greater role in these companies' corporate
governance at the expense of management control over the firm.
We conclude that tenure voting does indeed represent an intermediate
form of voting control from a managers' perspective: it does not guarantee
management control, as dual-class share structures do, but it does give
control to management who maintain large equity stakes in the firm.
Institutional investors are likely to see it as an improvement over dual-class
stock structures in terms of giving them corporate governance rights,
although it is less advantageous to these shareholders' rights than a one
share/one vote voting system.
Tenure voting could also be a preferable compromise to recent proposals
for time-limited dual-class voting schemes. One of these proposals would
limit the life of dual-class voting structures in order to ensure that companies
were required to hold a second shareholder vote to extend the life of a dual-
class structure.13 While this approach has the advantage of requiring fresh
shareholder input on whether to continue the existence of a dual-class ystem,
it also significantly weakens management's control rights and potentially
limits its ability to engage in long-term management practices. Tenure voting
with a committed large management block would preserve management
control and give shareholders the benefit of a well-aligned controlling
shareholder.
This Essay proceeds as follows. In Part I, we examine the legal
underpinning of tenure voting, including its statutory and common law basis
under Delaware corporate law, as well as the constraints imposed by the stock
exchange listing rules and the practical barriers resulting from stockholders'
widespread practice of holding their shares in "street name."4 However, the
proposed creation of the LTSE and recently enacted Delaware legislation
authorizing the creation of blockchain voting systems may well solve the
latter problems.
Capitalism, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1359, 1397 (2014). They have "acquired an aura of great influence
in proxy voting." Id at 1399.
13. Bebchuk and Kastiel make one such proposal (among other proposals). See Bebchuk &
Kastiel, supra note 3, at 617-21 (discussing several possible designs of a sunset clause and why
they favor the fixed-time sunset).
14. Shareholders that hold their stock through banks and brokers are said to hold it in "street
name." RANDALL S. THOMAS & CATHERINE T. DIXON, ARANOW AND EINHORN ON PROXY
CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 3-32 (3d ed. 2001) (discussing obligations of banks and
brokers in these circumstances). As we discuss below, this can make it difficult for companies to




Part II discusses the scant prior empirical and theoretical research on
tenure voting. The best-known empirical study is by Professors Dallas and
Barry.15 They found that tenure voting empowers preexisting long-term
shareholders but does not strongly encourage long-term shareholding. They
also found that companies typically presume most institutional investors are
short-term holders because they do not hold their shares in record name.'6
Part III discusses our data collection and provides an analysis of the
average shareholder composition of current American public companies.
Since the 1990s, the average annual portfolio turnover rate7 of all
institutional investors was rising until 2007, followed by a steady decline to
the long-term average (median) of 60%-65% (300/o-35%). Hedge funds are
the only category of investors whose investment horizon has been
consistently below one year. By comparison, banks, trusts, insurance
companies, pension funds, and endowments/foundations will qualify as
"long-term" investors using the three-year average holding horizon as the
metric. The rest (mostly mutual funds and asset management companies) are
intermediate-term holders. In a typical public company, short-term investors
tend to hold about 100/o-15% of the equity over time, while long-term
investors' stake has shrunk from about 40% in 1990 to less than 20% in recent
years.
Part IV presents our model of tenure voting and shows how its adoption
impacts control rights within the corporation. Using the data that we created
in Part I, and building on earlier work, we simulate corporate voting in two
situations: first, when management holds a large block of shares; and second,
when there is dispersed ownership. Central to our analysis is the importance
of third-party proxy voting advisors in influencing the segment of long-term
shareholders who benefit from any tenure voting scheme. In each of these
situations we consider how tenure voting affects the likelihood of a
pro-management vote. From our model it becomes clear that the distribution
of shares between those long-term shareholders who closely follow the
advice of a proxy advisor and those who do not is critical to understanding
tenure voting's effect.
Our model shows that tenure voting is an effective way for management
to retain control even in the face of negative recommendations from a proxy
advisor. However, this benefit decreases as the total number of long-term
shares increases. When management holds only a small stake, tenure voting
does little to protect management from a hostile proxy battle, and what little
15. Dallas & Barry, supra note 9.
16. See id at 602 ("A shareholder can rebut this presumption by providing evidence that the
shares have not changed beneficial ownership during the relevant period."); see also infra Part II.
17. This is a measure of how frequently investors change their stock portfolios. See infra
subpart EI(A) (discussing average annual turnover rates).
[Vol. 97:991
Tenure Voting
advantage there is depends more on the distribution of shares among the
long-term shareholders than on the actual amount they hold in total.
We finish in Part V with some brief concluding remarks and a discussion
of the policy implications of our results. We include a short technical
appendix that contains the important details on how our voting model is
constructed.
I. The Legal Basis for Tenure Voting Structures
Most major American public companies are incorporated in the state of
Delaware, generally because they believe that its corporate law is beneficial
to them.18 The Delaware courts have interpreted the Delaware General
Corporation Law (DGCL) to allow tenure voting provisions to be inserted in
the corporate charter. Further, a company's decision to adopt tenure voting,
pursuant to a shareholder vote, is subject to business-judgment review by the
Delaware courts.
However, stock exchange rules provide a greater check on publicly
listed companies' adoption of tenure voting. Furthermore, there are practical
problems that make it quite difficult to track ownership length for
shareholders who hold their shares in "street name," through banks and
brokers. Proponents of tenure voting have argued that blockchain technology
could be used to address these problems, but we show that even with the
newly passed Delaware legislation, it may be difficult to effectively
implement such a system. We explore these issues more fully in this Part.
A. Delaware Law on Tenure Voting
1. The Delaware General Corporation Law.-Shareholder advocates
have long maintained that investors' voting rights should closely track their
economic interest in the company to ensure that the investors' incentives are
properly aligned with those of the company and other investors.19 In order to
be certain that this alignment occurs, commentators generally have argued
18. The comparative costs and benefits of incorporating in Delaware have been the subject of
a vast legal academic literature that has gone on for several generations of scholarship. For a good
review of the arguments on both sides, see ROBERTA ROMANO, FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW
114-51 (2d ed. 2010).
19. See Randall S. Thomas & Paul H. Edelman, The Theory and Practice of Corporate Voting
at U.S. Public Companies (discussing the shareholder franchise and presenting an argument for why
shareholders should get a vote), in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 459-65, 469
(Jennifer G. Hill & Randall S. Thomas eds., 2015).
2019] 997
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that companies should use one share/one vote systems for shareholder
voting.
20
The common law mandatory rule of one share/one vote21 was short-
lived in Delaware. Prior to 1897, shareholder voting rights could be altered
in corporate bylaws.' However, in the Delaware Constitution of 1897,
Article 9, § 6 guaranteed the common law mandatory one share/one vote
rule.23 In 1901 and 1903, Delaware constitutional amendments removed this
provision.24
The DGCL favors one share/one vote as a matter of policy but tolerates
alternative voting structures. Section 212(a) establishes one share/one vote as
the default rule unless the company provides otherwise in its certificate of
incorporation.' Management can unilaterally adopt an alternative voting
scheme before the sale of stock.2 6 Following the sale of stock, a
board-recommended charter amendment hat is approved by a shareholder
vote can alter the corporation's voting structure.27
Early challenges to similar alternative voting schemes upheld tenure
voting. While § 15 1 (a) requires that all stocks in the same class have uniform
"voting powers,"2 in Providence & Worcester Co. v. Baker,2 9 the Delaware
Supreme Court found that a scaled voting structure did not create disparate
voting powers in a class of stock.30 In that case, the voting scheme awarded
greater voting power to stocks based on the size of the share bloc.31 The court
reasoned that the quantity requirements were a restriction on voting rights,
not voting powers, because all shares enjoy the same opportunity to attain
more votes.2 "The voting power of the stock in the hands of a large
stockholder is not differentiated from all others in its class" because other
stockholders exercise the same voting rights by attaining the threshold
20. Id.
21. David L. Ratner, The Government of Business Corporations: Critical Reflections on the
Rule of "One Share, One Vote," 56 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 3 (1970).
22. "Under the first Delaware Corporation Law, voting rights were left to the by-laws ... 
Providence & Worcester Co. v. Baker, 378 A.2d 121,123 (Del. 1977) (citing 17 Del. Laws Ch. 147,
§ 18 (1883)).
23. Id. at 123.
24. Id.
25. "Unless otherwise provided in the certificate of incorporation and subject to § 213 of this
title, each stockholder shall be entitled to 1 vote for each share of capital stock held by such
stockholder." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(a) (2011).
26. Id. § 241(a).
27. Id. § 242(b)(1).
28. Id. § 151(a).
29. 378 A.2d 121 (Del. 1977).
30. Id. at 123-24.
31. Baker v. Providence & Worcester Co., 364 A.2d 838, 840 (Del. Ch. 1976), vacated, 378
A.2d 121 (Del. 1977).
32. Providence & Worcester, 378 A.2d at 123.
[Vol. 97:991998
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number of shares.33 The scaled voting structure in Providence & Worcester
is analogous to tenure voting, simply substituting the limiting factor of
holding duration for holding size.34
2. Unilever and Williams v. Geier.-Prior to Williams v. Geier,35 the
decision of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York in
Unilever Acquisition Corp. v. Richardson- Vicks, Inc.36 was the only decision
addressing tenure voting under Delaware law. In Unilever, the Richardson-
Vicks board of directors voted for the issuance of a stock dividend to common
stockholders consisting of one "preferred stock" for every five shares of
common stock.37 The preferred stock was a superior voting share entitled to
cast twenty-five votes on all issues that common stock could vote on;
however, if the preferred stock was transferred, then it reverted to five votes
until held for thirty-six months.3 8 Unilever, a potential acquirer, challenged
the stock dividend as an illegal interference with stockholder voting rights.
39
The federal district court found that the stock dividend was
impermissible under Delaware law because the board exceeded its authority
granted by the corporate charter.' The charter allowed the board to issue new
series of stock with identical voting rights, and the court held that the
preferred stock with tenure voting created separate classes of stock.41 The
Unilever court distinguished the board's action from Providence &
Worcester, because the alternative voting scheme in Providence & Worcester
was in the company's charter for a century.42 Second, the court held that
issuance of tenure voting stock constituted a restriction on transfer under
DGCL § 202, requiring the approval of affected stockholders.43
In Williams, the Delaware Supreme Court rejected Unilever, holding
that a board's recommendation of a charter amendment o adopt tenure voting
is subject to business-judgment review." The facts of the case showed that
33. Id.
34. See Sagusa, Inc. v. Magellan Petroleum Corp., Civ. A. No. 12,977, 1993 WL 512487, at
*1-2 (Del. Ch. 1993), afid, 650 A.2d 1306 (Table) (Del. 1994) (upholding per capita voting
requiring majority of persons and majority of shares to vote in favor).
35. 671 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1996).
36. 618 F. Supp. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
37. Id. at 408.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 409.
41. Id. at 410 (finding that the tenure voting stock "strips the shareholder of the ability to
transfer voting rights without prior warning, compensation or shareholder authorization, creating
two classes within one series of shares-those that have been recently acquired, with reduced votes,
and those that have not, with full votes').
42. Id. at 409-10.
43. Id.
44. Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1371 (Del. 1996); see also 1 R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI &
2019] 999
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the defendant-corporation, Milacron, was a controlled corporation,
dominated by the Geier family.45 The board recommended to shareholders a
charter amendment hat created a high-low tenure voting structure, known as
the Recapitalization Plan.4 It granted existing stockholders ten votes per
share.47 Shares sold or transferred after the effective date would revert to one
vote per share, and newly issued shares would have one vote per share
initially."4 After thirty-six consecutive months of ownership, the shares
would be entitled to ten votes.49 The Chancery Court analyzed the claim that
the directors' recommendation breached their duty of loyalty under the
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.5°  standard, categorizing the
Recapitalization Plan as a defensive measure and finding the plan was
reasonable given the threat.51 On appeal, the plaintiff-shareholder claimed
the more onerous standard in Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp. 52 applied
to the board's recommendation.53
The Delaware Supreme Court found neither the Unocal nor the Blasius
standard applied.' The court held that only unilateral, defensive board action
triggers the higher Unocal standard.55 It reasoned that the shareholder vote
approving the amendment precluded Unocal analysis.56 The even stricter
JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
§ 6.50 (3d ed. 2018) ("[TMhe Court rejected the reasoning of [Unilever] without citing or discussing
it.'.
45. Williams, 671 A.2dat 1371.
46. Id at 1372-73. The structure was based on the same tenure voting plan used by
family-controlled Smuckers. Id. at 1372. This "high-low" voting plan is essentially the same model
that Berger et al. advocated more companies adopt See Berger et al., supra note 6, at 305, 316-17
(discussing the viability of tenure voting systems).
47. Williams, 671 A.2d at 1372.
48. Id
49. Id.
50. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
51. Williams, 671 A.2d at 1371. Unocal was a landmark Delaware Supreme Court decision that
created a new standard for analyzing dynamic takeover defenses adopted by a board of directors.
Unocal, 493 A.2d at 949. Unocal found that a board may oppose a takeover threat it reasonably
perceives to be harmful to the corporation. Id at 953-58. The response must be reasonable in light
of the perceived threat. Id. at 955. Delaware courts have given boards significant discretion to
determine a "perceived threat." See, e.g., id. (noting that threats may come from third parties or
other shareholders).
52. 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988).
53. Williams, 671 A.2d at 1376. Blasius requires defendants to show a "compelling
justification" when they take action whose primary purpose is to impede shareholder voting.
Blasius, 564 A.2d at 661.
54. Williams, 671 A.2d at 1376.
55. Id at 1377. Unocal's enhanced judicial review applies in cases where the board of directors
adopts defensive tactics to fend off an unwanted hostile takeover bid. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954-
55 (discussing the judicial standard that applies to a board's defensive action taken in response to a
takeover bid).
56. Williams, 671 A.2d at 1376. The Blasius test is frequently invoked by plaintiffs but rarely
applied by the Delaware courts. Id
1000
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Blasius standard applies "only where the primary purpose of the board's
action [is] to interfere with or impede exercise of the shareholder franchise,"
and when shareholders "are not given a fifll and fair opportunity to vote."57
The court held the record lacked evidence that the purpose of the charter
amendment was to disenfranchise shareholders and further held that the
shareholders had been given a full and fair opportunity to vote.58 After
Williams, there remains no doubt that Delaware law permits tenure voting
systems.
B. Stock Exchange Listing Requirements
For public companies, the stock exchange listing rules provide a second
layer of regulation that governs alternative voting schemes. In July 1988, the
SEC enacted Rule 19c-4, which prohibited stock exchanges from permitting
dual-class equity in listing standards amid fears of shareholder
disenfranchisement9 Passing Rule 19c-4 effectively required exchanges to
keep the one share/one vote rule by barring listed companies from issuing
shares carrying more than one vote.6 However, shortly thereafter, the D.C.
Circuit struck down Rule 19c-4, stating that it regulated an issue of corporate
governance that did not further the purposes of the Exchange Act.6"
Within a few years of that decision, the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) (and other exchanges) adopted a voting rights policy that had some
similarities to the now-defunct SEC Rule 19c-4.62 The NYSE listing
standards state: "Voting rights of existing shareholders of publicly traded
common stock registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act cannot be
disparately reduced or restricted through any corporate action or issuance."63
The NASDAQ has its own similar rule.64 The NYSE standard, based on Rule
57. Id (quoting Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 92 (Del. 1992)) (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
58. Id at 1376.
59. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FiNANCIAL CRISIs 31
(2012).
60. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Short Life and Resurrection of SEC Rule 19c-4, 69 WASH. U.
L.Q. 565, 575-76 (1991).
61. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 407-08 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
62. See Bainbridge, supra note 60, at 625 ("[T]he NYSE and NASD have adopted listing
standards, with SEC approval under section 19(b), that are essentially identical to rule 19c-4."); see
also Berger et al., supra note 6, at 304 (noting that the exchanges adopted voting policies that were
more flexible than Rule 19c-4, recognizing the need for additional flexibility as capital markets and
needs of companies change over time).
63. NYSE Listed Company Manual § 313.00(A); NYSE American LLC Company Guide § 122
(quoting NYSE Listed Company Manual § 313.00(A)); see also Order Granting Approval to Rule
Changes Relating to the Exchanges' and Association's Rules Regarding Shareholder Voting Rights,
59 Fed. Reg. 66,570, at IH.A (Dec. 27,1994) [hereinafter SEC Approval] (same); NASDAQ Listing
Rule 5640 (same).
64. See Bainbridge, supra note 60, at 625 (stating that NASD adopted standards essentially
identical to Rule 19c-4).
2019] 1001
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19c-4, is more flexible than the earlier, defunct SEC rule: the NYSE policy
permits publicly listed companies to adopt alternative voting schemes, such
as tenure voting, when issuing stock in an initial public offering (IPO).65
The NYSE voting rights policy precludes companies from adopting
tenure voting plans for existing shares. The standards li t "adoption of time
phased voting plans" as an example of corporate action or issuance that
would "disparately reduce[] or restrict[]" voting rights." Time-phased voting
includes "plans that restrict the voting [rights] of shares based on the length
of time the shareholder has held the stock," which is the equivalent of tenure
voting.67 Therefore, most commentators agree that listing rules allow the
adoption of tenure voting at only the IPO stage.
Overall, there is little disagreement that the NYSE rules constitute a ban
on tenure voting for existing publicly listed companies, although some
question whether the rule should be amended.6" Recently, Berger et al. have
argued that high-low tenure voting plans (such as the Recapitalization Plan
in Williams) do not violate the NYSE voting rights policy and can be adopted
by public companies for existing shareholders.69 They claim that a high-low
plan does not disparately reduce or restrict the voting rights of existing
65. See 14 GUY P. LANDER, U.S. SECURITIES LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
TRANSACTIONS AND CAPrrAL MARKETS § 3:179 (2d ed. 2002). Explaining the NYSE's standards
on voting rights, Lander writes:
To prevent listed issuers from disenfranchising public holders of common stock, the
NYSE has adopted a voting rights policy that is based on, but more flexible than,
former Rule 19c-4 under the Exchange Act (the Shareholder Disenfranchisement
Rule). Both... prohibit any corporate action or issuance that would disparately reduce
or restrict the voting rights of existing shareholders of publicly traded common stock
registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act. However, the NYSE policy... also
permits certain actions or issuances that would have been prohibited under Rule 19c-4.
The NYSE has stated that it will be flexible in its interpretations under this policy
because it recognizes that both the capital markets and the circumstances and needs
of listed issuers change over time.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
66. NYSE Listed Company Manual § 313.00(A); NYSE American LLC Company Guide § 122
(quoting NYSE Listed Company Manual § 313.00(A)); SEC Approval, supra note 63 (same);
NASDAQ Listing Rule 5640 (same).
67. 14 LANDER, supra note 65, at § 3:179 n.3; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-4 (2018) (observing
that "corporate action to impose any restriction on the voting power of shares ... based on the length
of time such shares have been held" is "presumed to have the effect of... restricting... the per
share voting rights of an outstanding class" of stock); NYSE Listed Company Manual § 313.00(A)
(prohibiting voting rights of existing shareholders from being "disparately reduced or restricted
through any corporate action or issuance," an example of which would be "the adoption of time
phased voting plans").
68. See NYSE Listed Company Manual § 313.00(A) (prohibiting publicly traded companies
from disparately reducing or restricting existing stockholders' voting rights); Tamara C. Belinfanti
Shareholder Cultivation and New Governance, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 789, 833 (2014) (referring to
tenure voting as "time-weighted voting") ("The NYSE standards thus effectively function as
immutable rules and bar the use of time-weighted voting for existing public companies.").
69. Berger et al., supra note 6, at 319-20.
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shareholders.70 Although the Delaware Supreme Court in Providence &
Worcester described alternative voting arrangements as "restrictions" on
"voting rights,' 71 Berger et al.'s reasoning is that the restriction is not
disparate, which tracks the reasoning used by the Providence & Worcester
court to permit scaled voting under DGCL § 15 1(a): tenure voting grants all
shareholders equal opportunity to gain additional voting rights.7' To the best
of the authors' knowledge, no public company has yet attempted to adopt
tenure voting in this situation.
C. The Beneficial Ownership Problem and Blockchain Technology
Prior to the 1970s, the United States had a "paper system" of stock
ownership where all the intricacies of transfer were completed manually by
clerks at brokerage firms.73 A clearing crisis occurred from backlogged
transfers in the 1970s that prompted the shift to a centralized, depository
model.74 A centralized system was advocated for by leaders of finance
because keeping shares in one place and in one name dramatically simplifies
transfer of stock.75 Thus, several entities were created to manage a true
depository system, eventually culminating in the Depository Trust Company
(DTC)76-the designated central securities depository.
Under the indirect holding system, the vast majority of stock is owned
by Cede & Co., eliminating the paper problem and resulting in almost
dematerialization of stock.77 Cede & Co. is a New York City-based
partnership founded in 1996 to hold substantially all of the stock in the United
70. Id. at 320.
71. Providence & Worcester Co. v. Baker, 378 A.2d 121, 123 (Del. 1977).
72. Berger et al., supra note 6, at 319-20.
73. David C. Donald, Heart of Darkness: The Problem at the Core of the US. Proxy System
and Its Solution, 6 VA. L. & Bus. REv. 41, 50 (2011).
74. See id. at 50-51. Summarizing the history leading up to the current centralized, depository
model, Professor Donald noted:
The current U.S. depository model of securities settlement was implemented following
a major market failure that culminated in 1970 .... Up until the 1970s, most securities
firms took care of their securities transfer paperwork through the manual work of
clerks.... As trading volume steadily increased in the late 1960s, brokers fell behind
in this "back office" processing of transaction settlements .... During 1969, the
inability of some brokerage firms to settle securities transactions created enormous
backups in deliveries, so that unperformed obligations could range from 70%/ to 200%
of a firm's total assets. Firms were forced to cover short positions caused by missing
securities through open market purchases, a strategy that was successful while cash
flow was strong. But as the market turned downward in 1970, brokers found their
working capital diminished, which forced them into default on outstanding delivery
obligations for which the securities had been lost or misplaced. As a result, over 100
brokerage firms either entered bankruptcy or were acquired by stronger competitors.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
75. Id at 56-57.
76. See id. at 59 (describing the development of the DTC).
77. See id. at 59-61 (discussing the role of Cede & Co.).
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States on behalf of the DTC. While stock is owned by Cede & Co., it is
registered in the broker's name.78 When stock is purchased by a stockholder,
the stock is registered under the name of the broker facilitating the
transaction, which is known as street name holding.79
Corporations are generally required to maintain a list of stockholders to
allow stockholders to exercise their rights, such as voting and inspecting the
books. Section 219(a) of the DGCL requires the officers of Delaware
corporations to create and update a stockholder list.' ° A shareholder is
defined as those registered on the annual stockholders list.81 The process of
compiling a stockholder list is arduous. At least twenty business days prior
to the record date of the shareholder meeting, the corporation must contact
the DTC to specify the participant firms-otherwise the entire stockholder
list could only contain one name, "Cede & Co." 2 This request is often called
the "Cede breakdown."3 Following this initial request, there are a series of
communications between brokers and banks, the DTC, and the issuer to
establish the beneficial owners of the issuer's stock. Unsurprisingly, this
process is ripe for error.
s4
Because of these difficulties, companies that use tenure voting
frequently have difficulty determining which of their shareholders are
entitled to receive higher voting power on their shares if the shares are held
in street name.5 The reason for this problem is that only record holders of
corporate shares are statutorily entitled to cast their votes, and when a
shareholder holds their stock through a bank or broker, the company has
difficulty determining who the beneficial owner is and how long they have
held the stock.6 The rapid increase of high frequency trading in the past fifty
78. Matt Levine, Banks Forgot Who Was Supposed to Own Dell Shares, BLOOMBERG (July 14,
2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2015-07-14/banks-forgot-who-was-supposed-
to-own-dell-shares [https://perma.cc/A34A-NVSC].
79. Donald, supra note 73, at 56-57.
80. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 219(a) (2011).
81. Id § 219(c); Williams v. Sterling Oil of Okia., Inc., 267 A.2d 630, 634 (Del. Ch. 1970).
82. Donald, supra note 73, at 68.
83. Id
84. Fiammetta S. Piazza, Bitcoin and the Blockchain as Possible Corporate Governance Tools:
Strengths and Weaknesses, 5 PENN ST. J.L. & INT'L AFF. 262, 293 (2017) ("Implementation of
blockchain could solve these issues given its accuracy and reliability levels deriving from
availability of copies of ledgers to all users.").
85. When stock is purchased by a stockholder, the stock is registered under the name of the
broker facilitating the transaction, known as street name holding. Donald, supra note 73, at 56-57.
86. Under the street name registration system, shares are generally registered under the broker's
name, not the investor's. Id. Street name holding is not uncommon. In 1993, the New York Times
reported that "Peter Quick of the discount brokerage firm Quick & Reilly estimate[d] that 75 to 80
percent of all shares [were] held in street name and that the percentage [was] growing." Andree
Brooks, STOCKS; 'Street Name' Accounts: Benefits with Minuses, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 1993),
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/08/07/news/stocks-street-name-accounts-benefits-with-
minuses.html [https'J/perma.cc/YHP5-F5W4]. Beneficial ownership then occurs through various
legal entities. This puts a substantial administrative burden on shareholders and companies to
2019] Tenure Voting 1005
years has made ownership murkier.8 7 Companies therefore commonly treat
all shares held in street name as low-vote stock.88 Thus, stockholders who
own shares in street name are disparately impacted by tenure voting plans.
They do not share an equal opportunity to gain increased voting rights by
long-term ownership because the company is not accurately tracking the
duration of these holdings.
8 9
Recent legislation in Delaware permitting companies to adopt
blockchain (also called distributed ledger) technology may solve this
problem.9 Blockchain technology allows for stock ownership to be digitally
tracked, so all shareholders would own stock in their names.91 Clearing and
settlement of securities transactions could be instantaneous through
digitization of securities and blockchain technology.2 In December 2016,
after receiving approval from the SEC in December 2015, Overstock became
the first public company to offer digital securities.93 According to the
attempt to track beneficial ownership. See Levine, supra note 78 (discussing the difficulties of
tracking stock ownership).
87. See Michael Morelli, Regulating Secondary Markets in the High Frequency Age: A
Princoled and Coordinated Approach, 6 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 79, 100-07
(2016) (analyzing how high frequency trading presents challenges for securities regulation).
88. Dallas & Barry, supra note 9, at 602. All the companies in the Dallas and Barry study,
discussed infra Part H, treated street name shares as short-term shares. Id.
89. Tenure voting has not gained a foothold in the United States partially due to logistical
barriers imposed by trackability of ownership. In the Dallas and Barry study, half of the companies
in the study eventually rescinded their tenured voting schemes and several cited the administrative
burden as a cause. Dallas & Barry, supra note 9, at 593, 611, 614-15. For example, after rescinding
its tenure voting system, Church & Dwight stated in its proxy statements that tenure voting was a
"burdensome" system that produced "confusion as to the distribution of voting power" and
"substantially complicated the [c]ompany's stockholder records and proxy voting procedures."
Church & Dwight Co., Inc., Proxy Statement (Form PRE 14A), at 27 (Mar. 21, 2003).
90. Louis G. Hering & Melissa A. DiVincenzo, 2017 Amendments to Delaware's General
Corporation Law and Alternative Entity Statutes, BLOOMBERO BNA: CORPORATE LAW AND
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 1-2 (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.mnatcom/files/BylinedArticles/
DGCL-Amendments-2017%20-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/J22V-E9J8].
91. Berger et al., supra note 6, at 314-15. Blockchain refers to technology that stores
information in a chain of blocks, such as the entire purchase history of a good or asset. The
technology was developed for the digital currency, Bitcoin. See, e.g., Joanna Diane Caytas,
Developing Blockchain Real-Tune Clearing and Settlement in the EU, U.S., and Globally, COLUM.
J. EuR. L.: PRELIMINARY REFERENCE (June 22, 2016), http://cjel.law.columbia.edu/preliminary-
reference/2016/developing-blockchan-real-time-clearing-and-settlement-in-the-eu-u-s-and-
globally-2/?cn-reloaded=-I [https://perma.cc/W7M3-6SAS] (describing the origins of blockchain
technology and its potential impact on transactions); Kevin Maney, Trust and Verify: The Coming
Blockchain Revolution, NEwSWEEK (May 23, 2016), http://europe.newsweek.com/blockchain-
technology-will-remake-global-financial-system-462537?rm=eu [https://perma.cc/5KWR-22JR]
(same).
92. Caytas, supra note 91. Securities trading has relied on "trusted third parties" such as banks
for clearing and settlement. Clearing consists of comparing records of the buyer and seller, and
settlement involves transfer of ownership by a custodian for consideration. Id.
93. Tom Zanki, Overstock Issues First-Ever Blockchain Shares in $1IM Offer, LAW360
(Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/873790/overstock-issues-first-ever-blockchain-
shares-in- Ilm-offer [https://perma.cc/5JVS-XAYQ]; see also Tom Zanki, SEC Approval of Digital
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Overstock proxy statements, the digital securities could be held in the
purchaser's name directly. 4 The great advantage of this process for tenure
voting systems would be that it would make it easier for companies to trace
the identity of their shareholders and therefore more accurately assign high
and low voting rights.95
Delaware's response to the blockchain trend could foreshadow its
mainstream success. Former Delaware Governor Jack Markell launched the
Delaware Blockchain Initiative that committed the state to the use of
blockchain and requested legislators to clarify whether Delaware corporate
law permits use of blockchain to track share issuances and transfers.9 On
July 21, 2017, current Governor John C. Carney Jr. signed into law
amendments to the DGCL that allow companies to keep shareholder
information on blockchain distributed ledger technology and communicate
with investors via blockchain.97 The amendments took effect immediately.
98
The amendments allow corporations to issue stock using blockchain and
maintain stock ledgers through blockchain technology. Section 219 of the
DGCL, which requires a corporation's stock ledgers be used to determine
voting entitlements, was amended to expressly define "stock ledger." Now
"stock ledger" is defined as "[one] or more records administered by or on
behalf of the corporation in which the names of all of the corporation's
stockholders of record, the address and number of shares registered in the
name of each such stockholder, and all issuances and transfers of stock of the
corporation are recorded in accordance with § 224 of this title.""l
Maintenance of corporate records by use of electronic networks or databases
Shares Could Spur Experimentation, LAW360 (Dec. 18, 2015), http://www.law360.com/securities/
articles/739837/sec-approval-of-digital-shares-could-spur-experimentation
[https://perma.cc/YN8Z-W5Z9] (analyzing the potential effects of Overstock's blockchain
securities offering).
94. Overstock.corn, Inc., Prospectus (Form 424B3), at 34 (Dec. 9, 2015).
95. "In practice, voting via blockchain would be achieved by allocating eligible voters tokens
(also called 'vote coins') in a number that represents their voting power. Voters would then transmit
to addresses on the blockchain their vote, which would then be registered on the ledger." Piazza,
supra note 84, at 293 (footnotes omitted).
96. See Andrea Tinianow & Caitlin Long, Delaware Blockchain Initiative: Transforming the
Foundational Infrastructure of Corporate Finance, HARv. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE &
FIN. REG. (Mar. 16, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/03/16/delaware-blockchain-
initiative-transforming-the-foundational-infrasnlucture-of-corporate-finance
[https://perma.cc/CVY3-CMS8] (discussing the Delaware Blockchain Initiative that motivated the
change of Delaware law to allow blockchain stock).
97. Joseph C. Guagliardo et al., Delaware Encourages Blockchain Technology Through Legal




99. Hering & DiVincenzo, supra note 90, at 1.
100. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 219(c) (2017).
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is now permitted expressly by § 224.101 In addition, §§ 151(f), 202(a), and
364 were amended to allow notice required by statute to stockholders to be
delivered by electronic transmissions.02
Delaware's express allowance of blockchain paves the way for
modernizing securities transactions, but blockchain presents a new set of
challenges as well as a solution to the trackability problem. Blockchain
promises a myriad of benefits for shareholders: lower cost of trading, more
transparency in ownership records, and real-time observation of ownership
transfers that could facilitate shareholder activism.1 3 Blockchain could allow
activists to buy shares faster and cheaper than the current system that makes
locating stockowners for an outsider arduous.1 4 In addition, "[c]orporate
voting could become more accurate, and strategies such as 'empty voting'
that are designed to separate voting rights from other aspects of share
ownership could become more difficult to execute secretly.'
105
The potential downsides of blockchain are also manifold. First, the
gatekeeper--the party with authority to encode new transactions into
blockchain-has an enormous amount of power that could be abused: "The
gatekeeper can restrict entry into a market, assess monopolistic user fees, edit
incoming data, treat some users preferentially, limit users' access to market
data, and possibly share user data with outsiders."'1° Further, the security of
blockchain has posed challenges. High-profile bitcoin heists have made
headlines. While hackers have been unable to breach the security of
Coinbase, the most trusted cryptocurrency intermediary, its individual users
101. Hering & DiVineanzo, supra note 90, at 1-2. Analyzing the blockchain amendments, the
authors note:
Section 224 also requires that, in the case of stock ledgers kept by use of electronic
networks or databases, such ledger must be able to be used to prepare the lists required
by Sections 219 and 220, record certain information specified in Sections 156, 159,
217(a) and 218 and record transfers of stock as governed by Article 8 of Delaware's
Uniform Commercial Code.
Id.
102. Id at 2. Explaining several blockchain amendments, Hering and DiVincenzo observe:
The definition of"electronic transmissions," which is set forth in Section 232, has been
amended to include the use of electronic networks or databases and covers "any form
of communication, not directly involving the physical transmission of paper, that
creates a record that may be retained, retrieved and reviewed by a recipient thereof,
and that may be directly reproduced in paper form by such a recipient through an
automated process."
Id.
103. David Yermack, Corporate Governance and Blockchains, 21 REV. FIN. 7, 9, 17 (2017).
104. See id. at 20 (noting that transparency and greater liquidity lead to quick stock
transactions).
105. Ia at 9.
106. Id. at 12.
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are frequently hacked.107 Experts claim that the primary security risk of
blockchain is hacking of individual user accounts rather than system hacks. 10'
Lastly, the length of the phasing-in period and complexity of blockchain may
give some onlookers pause. Commentators have questioned whether
blockchain was making a mountain out of a mole hill and suggested that there
may be simpler ways of keeping a ledger. 'I Some experts estimate that the
phase-in period may take many years.110 This timeline dampens hopes that
blockchain would provide an immediate, fix-all solution for the trackability
problem.
II. Prior Research on Tenure Voting
In spite of the concern about the short-term orientation of corporate
shareholders, there has been remarkably little written on how to provide the
appropriate incentives to them to extend their time-horizons. One way would
be to reward them for holding their shares for an extended time. This
approach, essentially providing call-options to shareholders that vest over
time, has been explored by Bolton and Samama.nl
The alternative we explore, tenure voting, rewards shareholders with
extra influence in the decisions of the corporation if they retain their shares.
The best-known study of tenure voting is by Professors Lynne Dallas and
Jordan Barry, who examined twelve U.S. companies employing tenure voting
(referring to it as time-phased voting) to determine its effect on corporate
governance and managerial myopia.11 Dallas and Barry found that tenure
voting empowers preexisting long-term share owners but does little to
107. Jen Wieczner, Hacking Coinbase: The Great Bitcoin Bank Robbery, FORTUNE: THE
LEDGER (Aug. 22, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/08/22/bitcoin-coinbase-hack/ [https://perma.cc
/E65N-F93U].
108. See, e-g., James Risberg, Yes, the Blockchain Can Be Hacked, COINCENTRAL (May 7,
2018), https://coincentral.com/blockchain-hacks/ [https'J/permaucc/6NHM-8QGN] ("Reusing
passwords, filling victim to phishing scams, careless website operators and negligent exchange
employees continue to be the single most dangerous point of failure when it comes to the health of
the crypto economy.").
109. See, e.g., Matt Levine, Mortgage Bonds and Stock Blockchalns, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 12,
2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2017-09-12/mortgage-bonds-and-stock-
blockchains [https://perma.cc/AHQ4-32AL] (discussing blockchain as an alternative method of
keeping stockholder lists).
110. See, e.g., Jeff John Roberts, Companies Can Put Shareholders on a Blockchain Starting
Today, FORTUNE (Aug. 1, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/08/01/blockchain-shareholders-law/
[https://perma.cc/4HF8-U97P] (noting that corporate record keeping could take five years to change
because companies need "to get up to speed on the technology" and vendors need to build tools to
record the shareholder lists).
111. Patrick Bolton & Fr6dhric Samama, Loyalty-Shares: Rewarding Long-Term Investors, J.
APPLmD CORP. FIN., Summer 2013, at 88.
112. Dallas & Barry, supra note 9, at 551.
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encourage long-term shareholding.1" Despite a small and homogenous
sample size that inhibits drawing causal inferences, the study sheds light on
trends associated with tenure voting plans. The Dallas and Barry article
makes two basic points. First, the authors provide a policy perspective on
tenure voting, analyzing it in the context of corporate law and dual-class
equity scholarship.114 Second, the authors investigate their hypotheses by
studying twelve American companies with tenure voting.11
Dallas and Barry begin by examining three potential justifications for
adopting tenure voting to reduce management myopia. First, since tenure
voting gives long-term shareholders more control over management,
management will presumably focus on pleasing long-term shareholders.6
Second, tenure voting should encourage long-term shareholding by awarding
greater voting power based on duration of holdings.1 7 Lastly, it could change
firm culture toward a focus on long-term value maximization. 8
The validity of these claims is difficult to measure, particularly because
their sample size was small and comprised substantially similar companies.
Unfortunately, this seems unavoidable due to the limited pool of American
companies employing tenure voting.1 9 Ten of the twelve publicly listed
companies adopted tenure voting between June 1984 and June 1987, during
the brief window after the NYSE abolished mandatory one share/one vote
and before the current NYSE rule barring adoption of tenure voting post-IPO,
and which still remained on the NYSE.120 Ten of the twelve companies were
family-controlled, and their plans had features summarized in the note
below.121
113. See id ('[Tenure voting] empowers long-term shareholders .... At the same time, we find
that the percentage of long-term shareholdings consistently trends downward following the adoption
of [tenure voting].").
114. See id. at 549-50 (comparing time-phased voting and dual-class tock arrangements).
115. Id at551.
116. Id at 570.
117. Id at 571.
118. Id
119. See id. at 592-93 (describing the search process to find companies to examine in the
study).
120. Id. at 595.
121. Id. at 593. All of the companies were longstanding businesses when tenure voting was
adopted. Half of the companies were incorporated in Delaware, and they spanned a wide range of
industries, from finance to agriculture. Id at 598. The companies had a variety of plans-the most
popular plan awarded ten votes for long-term shares and a four-year holding period. Id. at 600.
Twenty-five percent of the companies had three-year holding periods, and seventy-five percent of
the companies had four-year holding periods. Id. Votes per long-term share varied slightly more:
two companies awarded four votes, four companies awarded five votes, and six companies awarded
ten votes. Id. The companies that adopted tenure voting post-IPO treated all outstanding shares as
long-term, while the companies that adopted tenure voting at the IPO-stage gave long-term status
to preexisting shares and not the newly issued shares. Id. at 600-01. Many companies granted the
board of directors significant discretion over the number and ownership of the long-term voting
stock. For example, Smuckers reset its holding period twice, in 2002 and 2008, which corresponded
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The authors found that for these plans, tenure voting did not reduce
managerial myopia by increasing long-term shareholding. Instead, the
concentration of insider ownership decreased when companies adopted
tenure voting.122 Moreover, tenure voting had no significant impact on
ownership by institutional investors, nor did it increase long-term
ownership.23  Long-term shareholder ownership actually decreased
throughout the course of tenure voting.
124
The Dallas and Barry study revealed that, like dual-class equity, tenure
voting provided for an increased wedge between ownership and control by
allowing insiders to partially sell their holdings while maintaining voting
power. The resulting increased agency costs might be offset if there was
increased external long-term ownership or a cultural shift in management
toward long-term value. However, they found no evidence to support these
conclusions. Importantly, six of the twelve companies studied subsequently
rescinded their tenure voting structures, primarily because it was not in
accordance with the "basic tenet of corporate democracy" that prevails in
U.S. companies.
125
More recently, tenure voting was the focus of a paper by David Berger,
Professor Steven Davidoff Solomon, and Aaron Benjamin that advocated for
its adoption. Berger et al. propose tenure voting as a more desirable
alternative than dual-class equity to address the problem of short-termism.
126
Managerial myopia is rising, they claim, for two reasons. First, Berger et al.
argue that holding periods have shortened even among institutional
investors.127 Second, they claim that increased shareholder activism has
with its acquisitions of other companies. Id. at 601 n.248. As a takeover defense, half of the
companies gave the board authority to reissue shares that were immediately entitled to long-term
votes-similar to a shareholder rights plan, i.e., a poison pill. Id. at 601. The companies often
conceded in their proxy statements that this was a takeover defense. Id. One-third of the companies
adopted an additional takeover defense that required large investors to notify the company if they
acquired 5% of outstanding shares; failure to notify the company resulted in resetting the holding
period as if the stock were transferred. Id. at 602-03. While most of the companies cited reducing
short-termism as one reason for adopting tenure voting, preventing hostile takeover attempts and
increasing flexibility of the company's capital structure was another listed motivator for adopting
tenure voting. Id. at 604-08.
122. Id at 620-21.
123. See id at 624-28 (explaining that they "found no evidence that [tenure voting] was
associated with increased ownership" and that "the [tenure voting] variable was not economically
or statistically significant" in estimating institutional share ownership).
124. Id at 629. This was to be expected in the early years following adoption because all of the
shares at adoption were categorized as long-term. However, even after the initial decline, long-term
shareholder ownership declined, likely due to insiders selling their shareholdings while minority
shareholders remained apathetic.
125. Id. at 611-12.
126. Berger et al., supra note 6, at 297.
127. Id. at 298-99.
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propelled management to be short-sighted.'28 Taken together, they view these
things as a threat to the health of the economy. 129
As a solution, the authors argue that tenure voting is a preferable option
to dual-class equity. The authors claim tenure voting increases investors'
incentive to hold, reduces myopic bias, attracts patient capital, and improves
firm culture.130 However, the claim that shareholders will increase their
holding due to the promise of greater voting rights has not been supported by
any empirical evidence. The other proposals, that tenure voting will reduce
myopic bias, attract patient capital, and improve firm culture, also rely on the
assumption that tenure voting will prompt increased long-term ownership
and that ownership is not passive. The structure of the tenure voting plans
that Berger et al. propose are very similar to the structures adopted by the
companies in the Dallas and Barry study.131
While all analysts agree that tenure voting can entrench management,
no research has analyzed the impact of tenure voting on the likely success of
a shareholder activist in a voting contest, such as a vote on a shareholder
proposal and short slate proxy contest. Obviously tenure voting reduces an
acquirer's ability to take over the board relying on their own voting rights
because not only would they need to acquire a control bloc, they would also
have to wait for the stock to mature. Less clear is how tenure voting will
affect the outcome taking into account the stances of outside investors with
different holding periods. This will be the focus of our theoretical modelling
exercise using a weighted-voting model in Part IV below.
To set the stage, in Part IlI, we discuss how we compiled the data for
our weighted-voting model. Surprisingly, we found that no prior academic
work has had a focused presentation of investor holding horizons, so we also
describe our data collection process for the benefit of future scholars.
III. Data Collection
In order to ground our assumptions in our weighted-voting model firmly
in reality, we gathered data on portfolio turnover by different groups of
institutional investors as well as the investor composition of these firms. Our
data on investor holdings comes from the Thomson Reuters Ownership 13F
database, a comprehensive database of quarter-end holdings of public equity
by institutions that exercise investment discretion over U.S. publicly traded
128. Id. at 299-300.
129. See id at 301 ("These actions have caused the leaders of some of the largest institutional
shareholders to cite short-termism as a potential threat to companies and, more broadly, the long-
term health of the U.S. economy.").
130. Id. at 307-09.
131. Berger et al. advocate for adoption of a high-low plan with a holding period of three to
five years. High voting stock should receive three to five votes, and there should be a voting rights
cap. Id. at 323. All of the companies in the Dallas and Barry study fit into this proposed framework.
See supra Part HI.
2019] 1011
Texas Law Review
securities with an aggregate value over $100 million. 32 The sample used for
our study spans the period of 1990 to 2015.
A. Portfolio Turnover of Institutional Investors
One important question for tenure voting systems is how frequently
investors turn over their shares. If a tenure voting system awards more votes
to shares that have been held for three years or more, for example, who are
these long-term investors and how likely is it that investors will hold the stock
for that length of time (or longer)? In order to come up with some estimates
of these values, we apply two methods to classify institutions into
"long-term," "intermediate-term," and "short-term" investors.
In the first method, we impute each individual investor's annualized
portfolio turnover rate based on their inter-quartile holdings changes.33 More
specifically, the annual portfolio turnover rate is compounded from the
quarterly turnover rates, whereas the latter is calculated as the lesser of
"purchases" and "sales," divided by the average portfolio size of the last and
the current quarters.34 Because we do not directly observe purchases and
sales, they are proxied by the total value of increase (decrease) holdings in a
quarter-end relative to the previous quarter-end. Therefore, the annualized
turnover rate imputed this way is a lower bound for the actual turnover rate
because it does not include trades that were reverted within the same quarter.
According to Puckett and Yan, who compare 13F data with full trading
data by some institutional investors (most mutual funds), intra-quarter
round-trip trades (which are missed from our imputation due to data limit)
"account for approximately 20% of a typical mutual fund's trades."'35 The
gap is smaller for other institutions that trade less frequently (e.g., pension
funds and insurance companies) than the average mutual funds and vice versa
for more actively trading institutions such as hedge funds.136 Therefore,
measures based on inter-quarterly position changes preserve the order among
different types of investors in terms of their actual portfolio turnover rates.
We classify a 13F institution to be long-term, intermediate-term, or short-
term if its imputed annualized portfolio turnover rate is below 33%
132. The Thomson Reuters Ownership 13F database aggregates information from 13F forms
filed with the SEC. The database is accessed via Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS), which
the authors' institutions have subscriptions to.
133. We follow the procedure outlined in Vikas Agarwal et al., Inferring Reporting-Related
Biases in Hedge Fund Databases from Hedge Fund Equity Holdings, 59 MOMT. SCI. 1271 (2013).
134. The lesser of purchase and sale is used, instead of the average, so as to be mostly free from
the impact of fund flows in and out of the institutional investors that are largely out of the control
of the portfolio managers.
135. Andy Puckett & Sterling Yan, The Interim Trading Skills of Institutional Investors, 66 J.
FIN. 601, 612 (2011).
136. See id. at 616 (stating that "the performance of money manager funds is about 16 basis
points higher than pension funds").
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pension funds; endowments and foundations; corporations; and other. The
summary statistics of portfolio turnover of all categories are reported in
Table 1.
Table 1. Portfolio Turnover by Investor Category
This table displays the turnover summary statistics by investor category.
Based on data shares by Agarwal, Jiang, Tang, and Yang39 and Agarwal,








































































Based on the mean turnover rate, we consider hedge funds to be short-
term investors; banks and trusts, pension funds, and endowment and
foundations to be long-term investors; and the rest to be intermediate-term
investors. Such a classification conforms to the common perceptions of
market participants.141
B. Investor Composition of Companies
Next, we focus on investor composition at the issuer (company) level
with regard to investment horizon. This will be important in our weighted-
voting model. For each company-year, we compute the average shareholder
turnover by calculating the equal- or value-weight average of portfolio
139. Agarwal et al., supra note 137.
140. Agarwal et al., supra note 133.
141. See Brian J. Bushee, The Influence of Institutional Investors on Myopic R&D Investment
Behavior, 73 AccT. REV. 305, 307-08 (1998) (describing an earlier study introducing such a









































increasingly transient shareholders. This is not the case, as shown in Figure 2.
The seeming discrepancy is due to the fact that large shareholders in most
companies have slowed down their portfolio turnover rates over the last
decade, while a small set of investors (e.g., high-frequency traders) are
driving up the trading volume.






Figure 3 plots the annual turnover rate, averaged over all stock with
equal weights, in each year from 1926 to 2016. The annual turnover rate is
defined as the ratio of annual trading volume during the year to the average
of the number of shares outstanding at the year-beginning and year-end. The
data are taken from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The
annual turnover rates at the stock level started to trend up in the 1980s and
then increased dramatically around the mid-2000s, coinciding with the rise
of algorithmic trading. However, it is important to note, as illustrated by
Figures 1 and 2, that increasing turnover rates at the stock level do not imply
that the typical or most institutional investors are churning their portfolio
faster, nor do they suggest hat companies are increasingly held by short-term
investors.
In addition to the summary statistics, such as average investor horizon
in given companies, it is also important for our purposes to explore the
relative composition of shareholders with different horizons, e.g., what
percentage of ownership stakes are held by investors with short- or long-term
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We have used this model earlier to investigate takeover contests142 and to
analyze the effect of lowering the size of poison pill triggers on takeovers. 1
43
It is a simulation model that estimates the probability of votes favoring
management given the distribution of shares among various constituencies
with different investment horizons and assumptions of the influence of third-
party proxy services on those constituencies.
A. Background to the Model
Following the methodology of an earlier paper by two of the authors
here,1'" we partition the corporation's shareholders into seven different
constituencies: Management, Dissident, four different institutional groups
(Institutions I-IV), and the Public. For each of these groups, we make some
baseline assumptions about its bias toward management as well as how
closely it follows a signal from a third-party proxy advisor (who, for
convenience, we identify as ISS). For this Essay, we further subdivide the
institutions into those who are long-term shareholders and those who are
short-term holders of stock. The long-term holders of stock will hold the
high-vote shares from tenure voting, while the short-term shareholders will
be able to vote only the shares that they own.
To keep things manageable, we will consider only the situation in which
a dissident has acquired a substantial stake in the corporation and is pursuing
a proxy contest. For this application, we construct four institutional blocks in
the following way:
Institutions I and II are the long-term institutional investors.
Institution I, including most passive long-term investors, largely follows the
advice of ISS. Institution II is the long-term investors who act independently.
Most of our results assume that neither of these groups has a preexisting bias
toward or against management's position. Given our interest in the possibility
of management entrenchment, we feel that this is the most conservative
position to take, and for the most part there is little difference in the results if
we assume a pro-management bias. We will comment separately on those
situations where it matters.
Institutions III and IV are the short-term institutional investors. We
assume that the former follows the advice of ISS and the latter acts
independently. In either case we will assume that they exhibit a bias against
management's position. We think that this assumption is consistent with the
observed behavior of hedge funds and arbitrageurs taking positions in
companies around the time of a corporate event, often with the intention to
142. Paul H. Edelman & Randall S. Thomas, Corporate Voting and the Takeover Debate, 58
VAND. L. REV. 453,455 (2005).
143. Paul H. Edelman & Randall S. Thomas, Selectica Resets the Trigger on the Poison Pill:
Where Should the Delaware Courts Go Next?, 87 IND. L.J. 1087, 1111-12 (2012).
144. Edelman & Thomas, supra note 142, at 456.
1020 [Vol. 97:991
Tenure Voting
facilitate the change. While this assumption affects the overall size of the
probabilities we report, it does not affect the relative sizes and hence does not
qualitatively change any of our conclusions. Table 2 gives a qualitative
explanation of our assumptions about the behavior of the constituencies and
the nature of their holdings. Details of how these assumptions are
implemented in our model can be found in the Appendix.
Table 2: Behavioral Assumptions for Major Shareholder Groups
Constituency Bias Toward Influence of Length of
Management Proxy Holding
Advisor
Management Pro None Long
Dissident Anti None Short
Institution I Neutral Strong Long
Institution H1 Neutral Weak Long
Institution I Anti Strong Short
Institution IV Anti Weak Short
Public Pro None Short
After we specify the distribution of shares among the constituencies, we
can begin our simulation. We consider two cases: first, when there is a
substantial block held by management, and second, when there is a
significant dispersal of shares. The former case is particularly important
because it is the most common situation in which tenure voting has actually
been employed.145 The latter situation is more speculative as to the potential
significance of allowing tenure voting in a dispersed ownership firm. We will
investigate how the use of a tenure voting regime changes the likelihood of a
management victory. As we will see, the role of the proxy advisor is
significant in this analysis.
We are also able to examine how different ways of allocating extra votes
in tenure voting might alter the outcome. We consider both 3-1 and 10-1
tenure voting schemes. The former is at the low end of one reform
proposal.1" The latter is the most common scheme currently in use.
147
145. See Dallas & Barry, supra note 9, at 548, 552 (noting that insiders controlled most of the
identified companies at the time they adopted tenure voting).
146. See Berger et al., supra note 6, at 323 (suggesting either three or five votes per share
depending on the holding period).
147. Dallas & Barry, supra note 9, at 600 (noting that, based on the sample companies, ten
votes per long-term share was the most common choice).
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B. Results of the Model
1. Concentrated Ownership.-As discussed earlier, tenure voting is
currently limited to firms with large management holdings, usually arising
from family-owned firms. Our baseline case consists of Management holding
30% of the stock and Dissident holding 10%. The latter assumption is
consistent with the work of Fos and Jiang, who show that in proxy contests,
the average dissident stake is close to 9.6%.148 We assume also that Public
retail investor's holding is 10% and their vote is biased toward Management.
These assumptions are consistent with the estimates given by Broadridge.149
We will vary the holdings of the institutional investors. Based on our
simulations, our conclusions are:
Tenure voting is a very effective way for concentrated ownership to
entrench itself against aggressive dissidents. However, this benefit decreases
as the size of the long-term institutional stake increases. In addition, as the
percentage of long-term shares increases there is little added benefit to
having tenure voting at a 10-1 ratio over a 3-1 ratio.
Table 3: Average Likelihood of a Pro-Management Vote Given an ISS
Anti-Management Recommendation
No Tenure 3-1 Tenure 10-1 Tenure
Voting Voting Voting
Long Term 0.42 (0.11) 0.62 (0.06) 1.00 (0.0)
20%
Long Term 0.36 (0.11) 0.47 (0.02) 0.48 (0.0)
30% 1 1
Long Term 0.42 (0.07) 0.47 (0.01) 0.48 (0.0)
40% 1 1 1
In Table 3, we show the effect of tenure voting on the average likelihood
of a pro-management vote in the face of an anti-management
recommendation from ISS.150 The rows show the total amount of stock held
148. Vyacheslav Fos & Wei Jiang, Out-of-the-Money CEOs: Private Control Premium and
Option Exercises, 29 REV. FIN. STUD. 1549, 1560 tbl.2 (2016).
149. BRoADRiDGE & PwC, 2017 PRoxY SEASON REvIEw 5 (2017),
https://www.broadridge.com/_assets/pdffbroadridge-2017-proxy-season-review.pdf
[https://perma.c./AH9C-ELPR].
150. Some further explanation of this table is necessary. The first row is obtained by holding
the sum of the long-term institutional holdings (Institution I and Institution 11) at 21%. This is done
for technical reasons to avoid ties in the model. The results are qualitatively the same for all holdings
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by the long-term institutions. The number is the average of the probability of
a pro-management outcome given an anti-management recommendation by
ISS, where the average is taken over all the ways to share that amount of
stock between the two types of long-term investors. The number in
parentheses is the standard deviation of those probabilities.
At a typical external long-term holding amount of 20%, we see that
management can vastly improve its likelihood of a friendly vote by instituting
tenure voting, and the more generous the tenure supplement the better.
Interestingly, as the size of the long-term holding increases, this benefit
decreases. There is still an advantage to management, but it drops by as much
as half while the difference between a 10-1 supplement and a 3-1 supplement
disappears. The intuition for this outcome is that as long-term holdings
increase, the number of institutions that take proxy advice increase, and so a
negative recommendation from the advisor has a larger impact on the
outcome. We can see in Table 4 the opposite side of this effect by considering
the likelihood of a pro-management outcome given a pro-management
recommendation by ISS.
Table 4: Average Likelihood of a Pro-Management Vote Given a
Pro-Management Recommendation
Baseline 3-1 Tenure 10-1 Tenure
Voting Voting
Long Term 0.91 (0.05) 0.98 (0.02) 1.00 (0.0)
20%
Long Term 0.92 (0.05) 0.97 (0.01) 0.97 (0.0)
30%
Long Term 0.94 (0.05) 0.97 (0.0) 0.97 (0.0)
40% 1 1
Of course, this pro-management effect is much more limited because
management was already likely to win a contest.
As management's share drops, one still observes a benefit of tenure
voting and, on a relative basis, the advantage of tenure voting actually
increases. As an example, Table 5 shows the results if management holds
in and around 20, however. The remaining shares are allocated evenly between the two short-term
institutions (Institution m and Institution IV) with Public getting 10. Numbers reported are obtained
by taking the average of the probabilities gotten from the model while ranging over all integral
distributions of the 21% between Institution I and Institution II, i.e., we computed the likelihood of
a pro-management vote when II = 0 and 12 = 21, then I1 = 1 and 12 = 20, 11 = 2 and 12 = 19, etc.,
then averaged the result. The other rows are computed similarly with only the long-term holdings
at 31% and 41%, respectively. The number in parentheses is the standard eviation.
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only 20% of the stock. As one would expect, the likelihood of management
success is less when its holding is smaller. But when the external long-term
holdings are large, the advantage of tenure voting over the baseline stays
significant. For example, when long-term holdings are 40%, our baseline no-
tenure voting estimate gives management a 27% chance of winning, but with
tenure voting that increases to between 40% and 44% depending on the
bonus. Indeed, the likelihood of success in this instance is nearly identical to
that shown in Table 3 when management holds 30% of the stock.
Table 5: Likelihood of a Pro-Management Vote Given an ISS
Anti-Management Recommendation with
Small Management Holding
Baseline 3-1 Tenure 10-1 Tenure
Voting Voting
Long Term 0.18 (0.05) 0.36 (0.13) 0.43 (0.11)
20%
Long Term 0.23 (0.1) 0.38 (0.14) 0.44(0.11)
30% _ I
Long Term 0.27 (0.12) 0.40 (0.13) 0.44 (0.11)
40% 1 1 1
Hidden in these tables is the importance of how the long-term shares are
allocated between those institutions that follow ISS and those that do not.
How the distribution of long-term shares, between those that follow ISS and
those that do not, affects the likelihood of management success is captured
by the standard deviation-the number in parentheses in each cell of Tables
4-6. Each cell represents an average over the way the long-term shares are
divided between Institution I and Institution II, so the standard deviation
measures how much variation in the probability of management success there
is among those different allocations. As an example, in Table 3 we see that
under our baseline method of voting, the larger the long-term holding, the
smaller the standard deviation (from 0.11 to 0.11, to 0.07, reading down the
column), so we conclude that the actual distribution of the long-term shares
matters less as the size of that holding increases.
Note that in Tables 4 and 5 the implementation of tenure voting
decreases the standard deviation of the probability. That is, the importance of
the distribution of the shares between long-term shareholders is less
important under tenure voting than regular voting.
This effect reverses in Table 5. The distribution of long-term shares
between the two types of institutions becomes more significant with tenure
voting than with regular voting. For example, under the baseline method with
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long-term shares at 20%, there is a standard deviation of 0.05, whereas with
a 3-1 tenure vote the standard deviation is 0.13, more than double.
Thus, if management instituted tenure voting while holding 30% of the
shares with the expectation that they will divest themselves of some of those
shares in the future, the result will be to significantly increase their risk in
two ways. First, just shrinking their stake lowers the likelihood of winning a
proxy contest. We see this clearly by comparing the values in Table 3, where
management holds 30%, and Table 4, where management holds only 20%,
although the effect is moderated in the case of a 10-1 bonus.
The second source of risk is in the distribution of the long-term shares.
We see that the standard deviation of the outcomes varies more with tenure
voting than regular voting. Since we do not know, a priori, what that
distribution might look like in a counterfactual world of tenure voting and
small management holding, management will take on all of that risk. As we
will see now, this is even more important in the case of dispersed
shareholding.
151
2. Dispersed Ownership.-For analyzing the use of tenure voting in
dispersed ownership, we will assume that Management holds 3% of the
shares and the hostile Dissident still holds 10%. We will consider two cases,
one in which the long-term institutions hold a total of 21% and a second case
in which they hold 31%.152 We assume the remaining shares are divided
equally between the short-term institutions with the Public holding 10%.
Based on our simulations, our conclusions are:
In the dispersed shareholder setting there is little advantage to
management to implement tenure voting in light of a negative ISS
recommendation. There is some benefit to management in light of a
positive ISS recommendation. What benefit there is depends more on
the distribution of the shares between the long-term shareholders than
on the amount that the long-term shareholders own. Often there is
little or no benefit at all.
151. We did similar runs under the assumption that the long-term institutions had a more
pro-management bias. While the likelihood of a management win increases, the overall pattern we
describe remains.
152. The first case is motivated by our analysis that on average 200/o of a dispersed firm's shares
are long-term The second case is to consider the effect if there is an increase of long-term
shareholding in response to the introduction of tenure voting. The non-round values of 21 and 31




Table 6: Likelihood of Pro-Management Vote with Long-Term
Holding 21% Given the Amount Held by Institution I Shareholders
Institution I Baseline Vote 3-1 Tenure 10-1 Tenure
Shares Voting Voting
+ -- + -- -
5 0.54 0.13 0.63 0.18 0.56 0.44
10 0.71 0.14 0.79 0.16 0.81 0.19
15 0.70 0.04 0.83 0.05 0.93 0.07
20 0.75 0.04 0.90 0.07 0.93 0.07
In Table 6 we show the likelihood of a pro-management vote when the
long-term shareholders have a total of 21% of the shares. The rows are
indexed by what share of that 21% is held by Institution I investors--those
who follow the advice of the proxy-advisor. We have listed only five of those
cases, but the amounts not listed are consistent with the pattern shown. For
each situation, we show the probability of a pro-management vote given a
pro-management recommendation from ISS (the + column) or an anti-
management recommendation (the - column).
What do we observe in this table? When the number of shares held by
Institution I investors, those that follow ISS, is small, there is little difference
between the results of a regular vote and one with a tenure voting rule of 3-
1, in the face of a negative ISS recommendation. As the number of shares
held by Institution I increases, there is some, though limited, benefit to
management of a 3-1 bonus if the ISS recommendation is positive.'53
A similar pattern emerges when the tenure voting is 10-1. The
difference is that when Institution I holds little stock, a 10-1 tenure voting
scheme can be quite helpful to management in the face of an anti-
management recommendation, e.g., if Institution I has 5% of the stock, then
we get an improvement from 0.13 to 0.44 in the probability of winning. But
as Institution I's holdings increase (from 5% to 10%, etc.) this advantage all
but disappears: the 10-1 voting bonus probabilities decrease from 0.44 when
Institution I has 5% to 0.19 when it holds 10% and then down to 0.07 when
Institution I holds 20% of the shares. The 0.07 probability of management
success under 10-1 tenure voting is little better than the 0.04 probability
under standard voting.
54
153. This same pattern appears even if we assume a more pro-management bias of the long-
term investors. Because of the similarities we are not displaying those figures.
154. In the case of 10-1 tenure voting, a more pro-management bias for the long-term
shareholders has an effect if the ISS recommendation is negative. In that circumstance, the
advantage to management does not wash out as the number of shares held by Institution I increases
but stabilizes at around three times the baseline value.
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Table 7: Likelihood of Pro-Management Vote with Long-Term
Holding 31% Given the Amount Held by Institution I Shareholders
Institution I Baseline Vote 3-1 Tenure 10-1 Tenure
Shares Voting Voting
+ + +
5 0.55 0.17 0.56 0.44 0.56 0.44
10 0.54 0.13 0.65 0.18 0.56 0.44
15 0.71 0.14 0.81 0.16 0.81 0.19
20 0.69 0.04 0.85 0.05 0.93 0.07
25 0.75 0.04 0.91 0.06 0.93 0.07
When the long-term shareholders combine to hold 30% of the shares,
the advantage of tenure voting is more robust, as can be seen in Table 7. The
effect of tenure voting is most important when the long-term shareholders
who follow the proxy advisor hold very few shares relative to the other long-
term shareholders. Here the likelihood of a pro-management vote in the face
of a negative recommendation is over twice the baseline in both the 3-1 and
10-1 tenure voting schemes (0.17 versus 0.44 for both when Institution I
holds 5%). This advantage persists in the 10-1 scheme, even when Institution
I holds 10% of the shares.
When Institution I is the dominant long-term shareholder, there is only
a modicum of benefit to management of initiating tenure voting. While the
likelihood of success given a pro-management recommendation increases a
little (from 0.75 to between 0.90 and 0.93 for 3-1 and 10-1 schemes,
respectively), there is little improvement for management if the
recommendation is negative (from 0.04 to 0.07 in the 10-1 scheme).
Conclusions
Tenure voting systems have been the subject of great attention in recent
years. As the flaws of dual-class recapitalizations have become more
apparent to institutional investors, tenure voting has emerged as a potential
alternative that could be beneficial to both corporate management and
shareholders. Tenure voting, in theory, gives all investors equal access to
superior voting power as long as they are willing to hold the shares for the
long-term, and hence it is not considered a natural entrenchment device for
the insiders.
In this Essay, we use a weighted-voting model to show that when
corporate management holds a large block of company stock prior to the
implementation of tenure voting and retains at least 20/o--30/o of the total
number of company shares on a long-term basis, then tenure voting will
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ensure that corporate managers maintain control of the company even in the
face of an attempted change-of-control transaction by a highly motivated
dissident shareholder. The net beneficial effect is tempered if long-term
ownership should increase significantly. However, if corporate management
chooses to sell off its company stock over time, so that its ownership levels
drop down to a low percentage level, then the use of tenure voting systems
does little to protect management control in a proxy contest for corporate
control.
Tenure voting has some preferable features to dual-class voting systems
as those systems permanently (or until a sunset kicks in, usually a long time
down the road) insulate corporate management so long as they control the
high-vote stock because the other investors cannot remove them. Tenure
voting, by comparison, preserves management's power only if it maintains a
large equity investment in the company, which also better aligns its interests
with those of investors. In this regard, we perceive the tenure voting system
as an improvement over a dual-class system in balancing managerial control
and shareholder rights. However, there are many other costs and benefits of
the two systems that we have not compared, such as the negative effect that
tenure voting has on the liquidity of trading markets. In light of these factors,





In this appendix, we give a few more details about the voting model used
in this Essay. We have employed this model in two earlier papers to
investigate the effect of the distribution of shares among institutions on
outcomes in corporate proxy contests.155 The details of the model can be
found in these earlier papers.
The model is designed to incorporate two important aspects of voting in
corporate governance. The first is that there are blocs and not just single
shares being voted, and the second is that there is an external signaler
advising at least some of the participants on the vote. The model itself is a
probabilistic version of a standard weighted-voting model from the theory of
cooperative games."5 Each bloc will vote for management with a certain
probability. For some of the blocs, that probability is a function of a signal
from a third-party advisor. The advisor's signal is, itself, probabilistic in
nature. Based on these probabilities and share percentages, we compute the
likelihood of a pro-management vote.
To specify the model fully, we have to choose a distribution of shares
among the voters and, for each voter, specify the likelihood that he will vote
for management given a signal from the third party. In Part IV we specified
the share distribution for each of our scenarios. What is left for us to describe
is how the voters cast their votes in each of the two contests we describe.
For our investigations, we will make the following assumptions:
Management always votes for itself and Dissident always votes for itself. Of
the two long-term holders, Institution I votes according to the
recommendation of ISS, 57 while Institution II is insensitive to the advisor
but is without any management bias. 15  For the short-term holders,
Institution III follows ISS and has an anti-management bias,59 while
Institution IV is insensitive to ISS but also has an anti-management bias."
The Public votes randomly with a pro-management bias. 61 For a discussion
of the sensitivity of the model to various parameters, the reader should look
at our earlier paper.
155. Edelman & Thomas, supra note 142; Edelman & Thomas, supra note 143.
156. The reader might consult GUILLERMO OWEN, GAME THEORY 207-10 (4th ed. 2013) for
an introduction to voting games.
157. In the notation of our earlier paper, p = r(0, 0, x), where x is taken from the probability
densityfor g depending on whether ISS gives a For or an Against. This specification assumes zero
bias toward management When we assume pro-management bias, we usep = r(0, 0.3, x).
158. p = r(20, 0, x). This specification changes top = r(20, 0.3, x) when we assume a pro-
management bias.
159. p=r(O,-0.3,x).
160. p = r(20, -0.3, x).
161. p = 0.75.
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